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The 2016 Global Economic Crime Survey conducted by PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP 
(2016), states that twenty-two percent of companies have experienced procurement fraud. The 
statistics have actually decreased since 2014 when twenty-seven percent of companies had 
experienced procurement fraud. However, procurement fraud is still one of the most costly 
fraudulent schemes. Despite the reduction, the Department of Defense continues to experience 
large procurement fraud cases, both in number and dollar value. A recent example is the 
Supreme Foodservice fraud case, which cost the Defense Logistics Agency $757 million dollars 
in fraudulent charges. (Jahner, 2014)  
The Department of Defense Office of Inspector General (OIG) handles most of the 
audits, of all types, for civilian agencies within the Department of Defense. It works to ensure the 
programs and operations of the agency are following all current legislation, regulation and 
procedures, and that fraud, waste, and abuse are mitigated and handled properly.  When the OIG 
discovers fraud, the case is referred to its investigative arm, the Defense Criminal Investigative 
Service (DCIS). This organization is specifically built to investigate potential criminal, civil and 
administrative misconduct in Department of Defense procurement actions.  The OIG has specific 
procedures regarding fraudulent schemes. This is DCIS’s top priority.  
Although not part of the Department of Defense, the Justice Department (DOJ) works 
closely with the OIG and DCIS in initiating civil and criminals cases dealing with fraudulent 
activity in DOD. DOJ has made major advances in recovering large sums of restitution in DOD 
and other agencies within the Executive Branch, using the False Claims Act, and has also made 
procurement fraud a major priority. It has recovered about $26.4 billion since January of 2009. 
(Department of Justice Office of Public Affairs, 2015) 
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Unfortunately, regardless of these agencies’ efforts, procurement fraud is still a 
significant cost to the Department of Defense. The agencies are fighting an uphill battle, doing 
more “clean up” investigations rather than proactive work. Although the misconduct is being 
discovered, it is after millions, sometimes billions, of dollars have already been lost. The 
Association of Certified Fraud Examiners disclosed in their 2016 Report to the Nations on 
Occupational Fraud and Abuse there was a total cost of $6.3 billion dollars over 1038 cases in 
the United States. The report also states that corruption cases have an average cost of $200k to 
companies that experience fraud. (Association of Certified Fraud Examiners, Inc., 2016)  The 
OIG states in its Semiannual Report to the Congress states as of September 2015 there were 
1,625 open investigations being investigated by DCIS. (Association of Certified Fraud 
Examiners, Inc., 2016) Based on the statistics given by ACFE and the DOD IG, the minimum 
potential cost incurred in these cases is $325 million, although most of the large procurement 
cases greatly exceed this amount as evidenced by the Supreme case. These losses are also being 
duplicated, and sometimes overshadowed, by the losses in the non-DOD agencies. 
Government agencies are in need of new tools and additional resources to properly deter 
this misconduct and reduce the losses. In an article posted on Publicintegrity.org regarding 
national security, the author states that procurement fraud was not a priority during the years 
President George Bush was in office even though government contracting grew by $200 billion 
dollars in the matter of fifteen years. President Obama has since implemented a high priority on 
procurement fraud, and created the National Procurement Fraud Task Force. Yet, we are still 
trying to recover money for the damages already incurred. (Schwellenbach, 2009) So how does 
the Department of Defense begin fighting procurement fraud in an offensive approach rather 
than a defensive approach? This paper will explore what procurement fraud is, and what the 
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government is currently doing to fight the scheme, and its accomplishments. Finally this paper 




















What is Procurement Fraud? 
 In order to adequately prevent or reduce fraud losses, one needs to know the specifics of 
this type of fraud. The definition of the fraud, the characteristics of typical perpetrators, how the 
fraud can be perpetrated, and other details need to be explained. With this information, 
prevention, mitigation and discovery policies and processes can be shaped around it, and 
weaknesses can be identified and mitigated. To discover ways to help the government become 
more proactive against procurement fraud, it is necessary to understand what is being fought 
against and attempted to be prevented.  
 To understand DOD procurement fraud, looking at the different aspects of procurement, 
especially the various contracting processes, is important. There are three basic methods of 
procurement: the competitive bidding method, the competitive negotiation method, and the sole 
source method. In each of these methods, a contracting officer is the leader of the process, and 
has the authority to obligate the government for a specific amount of money. Each contracting 
officer typically has a warrant, or dollar value limit, which is a maximum that they are permitted 
to authorize when awarding contracts, but, in some cases, this authority may be unlimited. There 
are also various levels of review depending on the dollar value of the contract. The Federal 
Acquisition Regulation (FAR) is the set of rules and procedures that sets forth the policies and 
procedures that must be followed by executive agencies in the acquisition process. (Federal 
Acquisition Regulation, 2016) 
In the competitive bidding method, the contracting officer uses the format and process 
outlined in part 14 of the FAR. He or she publicly posts a solicitation, which explicitly states all 
the details of the product or service that is needed. The FAR requires the contracting office to 
complete significant research in this method to provide potential bidders with as much 
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information as possible. The solicitation includes the products and/or services needed, any 
specifications the potential bidders may need to be aware of, such as any packaging and marking 
requirements, delivery or performance requirements, along with other pieces of information 
specific to the contract that will be awarded. The solicitation will also include the day in which 
the bids will be opened by an authorized official and recorded. Once the solicitation is created, it 
is posted publicly so that contractors can create bids based on the specifications. They are 
required to submit them on designated forms. The bids are then submitted to the government 
agency requesting the products or services, and the bids are secured in a lock box. The 
contracting officer has the right to cancel or modify the solicitation before the bids are opened. 
On the date specified, the authorized official opens the bids publically, reads these bids aloud, 
and records all the bids. The contracting officer will then choose one that has the best price, as 
long as it meets all the requirements set forth. (Federal Acquisition Regulation, 2016) 
 The competitive negotiation process is very different in that it looks for the best value to 
the government and not necessarily the lowest price. Due to the complexity of the material being 
procured by DOD, this method is used for most of the DOD procurements. Typically, the 
solicitation sets forth the final product being sought, and any required technical qualifications. 
The potential contractor has the freedom to propose the method of performance, most other 
details, and the proposed price. On the closing date, each offer is opened privately by the 
contracting officer, and the information contained therein is not available to any of the other 
bidders or the public.  There is a significant amount of negotiation between the contracting 
officer and potential contractor, until the contracting officer determines which potential 
contractor is the “best value” to the government. Once a contractor is chosen and negotiations are 
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complete, an official contract is drawn up and signed by both parties. (Federal Acquisition 
Regulation, 2016) 
The sole source method uses either of the above contracting methods, but there is no 
competition between potential contractors. The contracting officer has the ability to contact a 
specific contractor he or she would like to use for the product or service needed. There needs to 
be a strong justification as to why the contractor is being chosen instead of using an open 
competition type of process. In every method, an official contract is written up once a contractor 
is chosen, and both sides have agreed upon the different aspects of the project. (Federal 
Acquisition Regulation, 2016) 
USASPENDING.GOV reported that in fiscal year 2015, the federal government awarded 
over $439 billion in government contracts, and over $263 billion has been awarded so far in 
fiscal year 2016. Table 1 is an overview of awards dating back to FY 2008. Through these 
numbers, we can see the amount of money that could potentially be stolen in fraudulent acts can 


















$264,320,382,259 $444,579,420,571 $435,019,714 $980,574,444,589 $1,689,909,267,133 
2015 
$439,153,063,314 $617,392,573,979 $4,664,841,056 $1,776,104,509,555 $2,837,314,987,903 
2014 
$445,837,592,484 $603,174,418,497 $6,233,511,304 $1,710,256,859,214 $2,765,502,381,499 
2013 
$463,655,899,753 $521,544,174,145 $1,947,681,730 $1,929,199,167,738 $2,916,346,923,366 
2012 
$519,869,990,380 $543,098,079,086 ($116,592,782) $2,646,767,174,206 $3,709,618,650,889 
2011 
$539,992,481,867 $571,759,983,628 $2,459,778,434 $2,177,665,140,415 $3,291,877,384,343 
2010 
$540,217,470,955 $623,219,230,422 $2,814,856,807 $1,318,646,346,968 $2,484,897,905,152 
2009 
$540,810,039,982 $675,616,141,453 $693,164,123 $1,731,541,170,458 $2,948,660,516,016 
2008 
$541,277,041,036 $420,682,092,207 $438,648,746 $1,121,867,802,673 $2,084,265,584,662 
(USASPENDING.GOV, 2016) 
In the Journal of the Association of Inspectors General, Tom Caulfield (2014) states that 
procurement fraud is not only one of the most common types of government frauds, but it can 
also be one of the most costly types of fraud. In every procurement method described above, 
there is the potential for fraud. According to the International Anti-Corruption Resource Center, 
there are many common schemes used to carry out procurement fraud. These include, but are not 
limited to bribes and kickbacks, excluding qualified bidders, failure to meet contract 
specifications, fraudulent invoices, leaking bid information, product substitution, fictitious 
vendors, and many others. These are commonly seen by the contracting agencies and the OIG, 
and some are currently high priority for these organizations.  
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Bribes and kickbacks both entail giving something of value to another to influence the 
receiver’s decisions. Bribes are typically paid by vendors or their representatives to contracting 
personnel to influence the decision to choose their company for a contract. Similarly a kickback 
is essentially an illegal “thank you” from the vendor to another person, usually using the 
proceeds of the contract as a guide. These payments do not necessarily have to be monetary; they 
can also include vacations, cars, clothes, and anything else of value.  
Through the investigation and review of prior cases, it has been determined that there are 
hints, typically called “red flags” that help investigators determine that fraud may exist. In the 
bribery and kickback area, these can include a sudden change in lifestyle of a procurement 
official, contracting officers accepting gifts of any value, vendors having a reputation for these 
types of transactions, and unexplained relationships between vendors and contracting officers. 
(Kramer, 2012) 
Excluding qualified bidders is typically a scheme carried out by a procurement official 
normally colluding with a bidding vendor. In this type of scheme, a procurement official is 
creating environments and specifications that become justifications to exclude other qualified 
bidders. There are numerous ways of carrying out this scheme, including creating extreme pre-
qualification requirements, or creating extreme contract specifications. There are also a number 
of red flags for this type of scheme, which include qualified bidders not submitting bids, 
unusually narrow contract specifications, contracting officer not publicizing the solicitation 
enough, and a short bidding time period. (Kramer, 2012) 
 Failure to meet contract specifications is another very broad scheme that can include 
many different aspects. This is carried out by a vendor, which knowingly submits material or 
services that do not meet the contract specifications. Red flags of this scheme include poor 
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quality of material or services, high rate of material failures, and failing to pass material or 
service inspections or tests.  
The submission of fraudulent invoices is another broad scheme, which can include false, 
duplicate, or marked up invoices. This scheme is carried out by the vendors knowingly 
submitting invoices for payment that are, in some way, fraudulent. False invoices are invoices 
being submitted for material or services not actually delivered. Duplicate invoices are invoices 
that are submitted, which have already been paid. However, the vendor is acting as though the 
payment was never received. Finally marked up invoices are invoices, which contain inflated 
prices that were not agreed upon. These red flags include not being able to account for the 
material or services being paid for, no documents to back up the payments, and multiple invoices 
containing the same data or information as another. (Kramer, 2012) 
Leaking bid information is another scheme typically carried out by a procurement official. In 
this scheme, a contracting officer is usually colluding with a vendor to ensure the vendor is 
awarded the contract. An example of the type of information leaked is the dollar value 
competitors have submitted in bids. This will give the vendor an advantage when placing their 
own bid. The red flags of this scheme include late bids being accepted, the difference between 
the winning bidder and next lowest being minimal, and the late bidder being chosen for the 
award. Fictitious vendors is a scheme carried out by a procurement official, and can be a form of 
embezzlement. The procurement official creates a fictitious vendor in the system to receive false 
payments for goods or services not actually delivered. Normally the fraudster will submit 
payments for services physical objects would need to be accounted for. Red flags include not 
being able to verify the vendor in a master list, any sort of directory, etc., and weak internal 
controls. (Kramer, 2012) 
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The final scheme that will be discussed is product substitution, which the OIG has made a 
priority in its audits and investigations, due to its danger to DOD personnel. This scheme can be 
extremely detrimental to the war fighters as vendors typically supply lower quality material or 
services, including defective parts, used parts, or counterfeit parts. By doing this, the vendor’s 
production costs are lower, which creates a larger profit from the contract. The vendor may pay 
some sort of bribe or kickback to inspectors to ensure the material passes inspection, submits 
false paperwork, or changes material after it is inspected. The red flags of this scheme include 
unusual packaging, unusual appearance, frequent complaints, and malfunctions with the material. 
(Kramer, 2012) 
  As shown in these examples of common misconduct, the usual perpetrator is a 
procurement official and/or vendor companies, employees of the vendor, and/or suppliers to the 
vendors. Procurement officials know what the auditors are searching for when looking for 
fraudulent actions. They have the ability to hide their actions for an extended period of time 
because they are trusted employees and know how to properly hide the misconduct. Vendors that 
work with government agencies are typically “repeat customers.” They will know how the 
procurement process works. They have worked with procurement officials often, and may have 
even developed a relationship with them. Some of these fraudulent schemes will be very easily 
carried out. Technology gives the perpetrators an advantage to falsify documents, including 
invoices, shipping documents, and receipts. Specific examples of the types of incidents being 






Supreme Foodservice  
 A notable fraudulent procurement case, and good example of fraudulent invoicing, is 
Supreme Foodservice (Supreme). Supreme is a contractor that supplied food to the troops in the 
Middle East through contracts with the Defense Logistics Agency – Troop Support (DLA), 
formerly known as Defense Supply Center of Philadelphia (DSCP). DLA is the Department of 
Defense agency that procures and supplies the warfighters with all non-weapon system needs, 
such as food, medical supplies, construction equipment, and uniforms. After a competitive 
negotiation process, Supreme was awarded, in 2005, the prime vendor contract to supply and 
transport food and water bottles to the troops in various countries including Afghanistan. This 
over $8 billion contract required the company to transport the supplies to active war zones. 
(United States of America v. Supreme Foodservice FZE, 2014) 
 After multiple audits, contract reviews, and investigation, DLA determined that Supreme 
had overcharged the government by approximately $48 million from 2005 until 2009. The 
investigation determined that Supreme had been overcharging for material and submitting false 
invoices for payment. Supreme used Jamal Ahli Foods Co. LLC (JAFCO) as a subcontractor to 
disguise the inflated prices for perishable foods and bottled water. JAFCO was a company 
created by the owners of Supreme, and who were involved in all business decisions for JAFCO. 
Both parties went to great lengths to hide the relationship from DLA. The two worked together 
to gain more money from the prime vendor contract. JAFCO supplied marked up prices and 
invoices to Supreme which then charged the government these marked up prices. (United States 
of America v. Supreme Foodservice FZE, 2014) 
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 A  December 2014 press release from the Department of Justice revealed that 
investigators found DLA had disputed the prices numerous times. On two different occasions, 
the contracting officer requested copies of the manufacturer invoices to see the prices. Supreme 
provided the invoices but removed the mark ups that JAFCO was adding to the material and 
provided various excuses as to why they were different than the ones originally submitted. One 
former executive was bribed to not disclose the ongoing fraud scheme to DLA. However, the 
Supreme fraud was eventually uncovered when another former employee became a 
whistleblower. Michael Epp, who was an executive of the company, provided the DOJ with a 
significant amount of evidence that assisted in the prosecution of the company.  Supreme pled 
guilty and agreed to numerous fines. They had to pay more than $288 million in criminal fines 
and $146 million in civil penalties. They were required to directly pay DLA back for the money 
they stole, which was determined to be a little over $38 million. The fines were split amongst 
Supreme and its various subsidiaries. (Department of Justice Office of Public Affairs, 2014) 
 Within the guilty plea agreement, Supreme agreed to multiple sanctions. First they agreed 
to pay the fines by certain deadlines. The plea agreement also states the payment of the forfeiture 
payments, restitution, and fines amount to a “just” resolution. The plea agreement states that 
Supreme was to immediately dissolve JAFCO and stop all business with this subsidiary. 
Supreme was mandated to remove the owners, both current and former, from any management 
position regarding business with the government for five years. Based on compliance with these 
sanctions, Supreme would not be debarred indefinitely from doing business with the government. 
(United States of America v. Supreme Foodservice FZE, 2014) 
  This is a great example which shows how detrimental an untrustworthy vendor scheme 
can be. This fraud lost millions of taxpayers’ dollars. This example shows just how damaging 
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this type of fraud can be, and how difficult it is to discover. With no whistleblower action, 
there’s a possibility that this scheme could still be ongoing.   
 
 
Barbara Lessner: Procurement Fraudster 
 Another notable procurement fraud case that occurred with DLA shows another 
weakness in the procurement system. This case involved a contracting officer abusing the power 
she held within the agency. Barbara Lessner was a supervisory contracting officer in charge of a 
group of nine buyers in the Medical Supply Chain of Troop Support. The group was responsible 
for contracts under a $100 thousand dollar threshold, which purchased biomedical equipment 
and equipment for hospital use. The only one with the authority to sign the contracts was Barbara 
as she was the only person that held a warrant. As described previously, a warrant is a license 
that states the person is trained and authorized to obligate government funds. The limitation on 
her warrant was $100,000. (Barbara L. v. United States of America, 2007) 
 At the demand of Ms. Lessner, the team began awarding numerous contracts to a 
company named Pamir. This occurred even when Pamir was not the lowest bidder.  A team 
member eventually brought this concern to Ms. Lessner’s supervisor, who began to question 
these choices. At this point, Ms. Lessner stopped giving assignments to this team member, and 
began forging the team member’s signature on contracts. The potential fraud was referred for 
investigation to DCIS, which began an investigation on all Pamir contracts that were awarded 
from DLA. The organization found that the contracts to Pamir were worth over $3 million, and 
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that there was almost $1 million worth of overcharges. (Barbara L. v. United States of America, 
2007) 
 DCIS also discovered, that on multiple occasions, Ms. Lessner was aware of a lower cost 
bid, and chose Pamir anyway. It was discovered that out of the one hundred sixty-three contracts 
Pamir was awarded, one hundred nineteen of the contracts were awarded regardless of lower cost 
options. DCIS, with the assistance of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, gained a search 
warrant for Pamir, and seized multiple documents and computer files. The files showed Ms. 
Lessner was providing information to Scott Watanyar, who worked with Pamir. The information 
provided included what competitors were bidding for different contracts Pamir was involved in. 
She also gave him advice on specific dollar values to bid. She provided him documents from 
particular procurement systems that were used to do research and purchase material. She also 
worked around the $100 thousand threshold she had by awarding multiple contracts to Pamir for 
the same material on the same days. It was discovered that Mr. Watanyar and Ms. Lessner had a 
personal relationship, not just a work relationship. (Barbara L. v. United States of America, 
2007) 
 During the investigation, the buyers were asked to review all of the awards that were 
made to Pamir, and discovered forged signatures on sixty-four of the contracts. The buyers also 
testified that, on those contracts that were not forged, Ms. Lessner had forced them to sign and 
award the contract to Pamir. DCIS interviewed Ms. Lessner and briefed her that there would be a 
search and potential seizure of documents and files from her desk. She was escorted off the base. 
Once off, Ms. Lessner called a team member, and instructed her to take a group of files off her 
desk and destroy them. She informed the team member that she was being wrongly accused. In 
April of 2005, she was indicted for twenty-one counts of various fraudulent conduct, including 
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wire fraud and procurement fraud. In September of 2005, she pled guilty to all twenty-one counts 
she was indicted for. Ms. Lessner was sentenced to 51 months in prison, three years of probation 
when released, and to pay $938,965.59 in restitution. (Barbara L. v. United States of America, 
2007) 
 This example shows how much damage contracting personnel can cause in the 
procurement process. Although she had an accomplice, the scheme was successful because of the 
strings that Ms. Lessner pulled. She instructed Mr. Watanyar on how to properly submit the bids. 
She had the knowledge and authorization within DLA to properly execute the scheme. She knew 
how to work around the threshold she had, and knew how to keep the red flags to a minimum. 
She was extremely effective as she forced DLA to overpay by almost $1 million.  
 
 
Departments Handling Procurement Fraud 
Defense Contract Audit Agency 
 The Defense Contract Audit Agency (DCAA) specifically audits government contracts 
awarded by the Department of Defense. The reviews include pre-award and post award services, 
system audits, and negotiation audits. The audits ensure that costs are reasonable and allowable. 
In the agency’s 2014 Year in Review, they specify cases where millions of taxpayers’ dollars 
were saved based on DCAA’s advice and audits. In addition to its procurement auditing function, 
DCAA also plays a part in the investigation and prosecution of fraud. When potential fraud is 
found they submit referrals to either Defense Criminal Investigative Services or the Justice 
Department. If the two departments need assistance with the investigation DCAA will help in 
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various ways such as collecting evidence, recreating transactions, helping with subpoenas, and 
other investigation tactics. The DCAA has been involved in cases that have successfully 
prosecuted based on the False Claims Act, bribery, and product substitution. (Defense Contract 
Audit Agency, 2014) 
 
Department of Defense Office of Inspector General 
 The Department of Defense Office of Inspector General is the organization charged with 
the review of all areas of the Department of Defense Operations. It makes recommendations to 
the agencies including ways to reduce costs, how to eliminate fraud, waste and abuse, how to 
strengthen the internal controls of the agency, and how to properly achieve compliance with 
various laws and policies. Its mission statement and vision statement explain that the agency’s 
main goal is to ensure agencies are “provided with independent, relevant, and timely oversight,” 
of all operations. In these activities, the OIG is protecting and supporting the warfighter and 
taxpayers, and the Inspector General reports directly to Congress and the Secretary of Defense. 
(Department of Defense Office of Inspector General, 2016) 
 The agency includes many different sub-groups and agencies, which all focus on 
different areas. Many of its auditors and investigators focus on procurement. The auditors review 
and organize audits of all areas of operations. They are the ones that make the recommendations 
as mentioned above. The auditing department focuses mainly on regular financial audits and 
systems security. They look for ways to improve current activities in all of the agencies. The 
auditors will also know the types of environments that are prime for fraudulent activity, and 
works with the agency to try to mitigate or even eliminate the risk. The Investigation department 
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is the Defense Criminal Investigative Service, which will be discussed next in more detail. 
(Department of Defense Office of Inspector General, 2016) 
 The OIG has various programs for DOD employees to anonymously submit possible 
fraudulent acts for review. The first is a DOD Whistleblower Program, which allows federal 
employees and others to report misconduct anonymously. Federal employees are required to 
report any sort of corruption or misconduct to the proper authorities. The employees of the OIG 
can only find so much as perpetrators know what is being looked for during audits and 
investigations. Whistleblowers are the auditors and investigators’ best tools. They know the 
system better, they know the organization better, and there is a high chance they know who the 
perpetrator is. There are various ways for the whistleblower to submit claims, but it is essential to 
all matters of national security of the government. The OIG also protects the whistleblower from 
any negative reactions. (Department of Defense Office of Inspector General, 2016) 
 The OIG also has extensive resources on their website regarding fraud, and that 
information is open to the public. The information is based on the environments that are best for 
fraudulent acts, and how the DOD employees can recognize potential fraud through red flags. It 
also explains the expectations of DOD employees should they see or suspect fraudulent 
misconduct is occurring, and explains the responsibilities of the auditors when conducting 
reviews. This allows any employee of any agency to access this, and gain more information 
about what they should be looking for, or how to know if there’s potential fraud occurring. 





Defense Criminal Investigative Services  
As stated above the civilian Investigation Department of the OIG is the Defense Criminal 
Investigative Services, which reviews and investigates fraudulent activities. It conducts both 
criminal and civil investigations based on information referred to them from other agencies such 
as the Defense Contract Audit Agency, the auditing department of the OIG, military agencies, 
and the DOD contracting personnel. The number one priority of DCIS is currently Procurement 
Fraud. According to DCIS, this fraud is hard to find, and can be extremely costly to 
organizations. Its second priority is product substitution, which was discussed earlier. 
(Department of Defense Office of Inspector General, 2016) 
DCIS conducts the investigations based on information found by auditors, provided by 
procurement personnel or whistleblowers, other government agencies, and many other sources. 
DCIS will typically receive little information, such as the people involved, the potential 
misconduct that occurred, and where the misconduct has occurred. The investigators then use 
various techniques to find evidence that either denies or confirms the reported suspicions. They 
may work with other government agencies throughout the investigation, such as the Department 
of Justice. Once the investigation is complete, the investigators will draft a report off all the 
findings. If there was evidence found of fraudulent misconduct, DCIS will pass on the 
information to the Department of Justice, which will move forward with the prosecution of the 
perpetrator, or to the original contracting officer to administer contractual or administrative 





Department of Justice 
  Although it is not a part of DOD, the Department of Justice (DOJ) is responsible for 
representing DOD, as well as all other federal agencies, in all civil and criminal actions. DOJ has 
a criminal and a civil fraud section to deal with all allegations of white collar crime. The Fraud 
Section assists with the investigation, and controls the prosecution of these cases. The Section 
also assists in public education of fraud, new policies, and prevention tactics to start fighting this 
crime head on. They help all industries with training sessions to educate the workforces on 
fraudulent acts. A quick glance at the procurement fraud section of the DOJ Fraud Section, it can 
be seen that they work with all areas, including Afghanistan contract fraud, fraud within the 
National Guard, and various others. (Department of Justice, 2016) 
In recent years, the Justice Department has recovered a large amount of money through 
the Civil False Claims Act. The False Claims Act is a strong and important tool for obtaining 
civil recoveries for misconduct against the government. The False Claims Act was first approved 
by Congress in the Civil War era, and was remodeled in the 1980s to make it more effective. The 
remodel was completed because of the drastic amount of fraudulent activity occurring in 
procurement fraud. The Act can be used against perpetrators who have made fraudulent claims 
against the government. For example, the False Claims Act can be used against perpetrators who 
submit false invoices into an accounting system. Through this act, the DOJ has recovered over 
$13 billion in various cases since 2013. These settlements and judgements have been through 





Auditors VS. Certified Fraud Examiners 
 Although each of the above Departments are working hard and succeeding in fighting 
fraud and recovering large amounts of restitution from fraud cases, there is still room for 
improvement. These agencies are working in a reactive manner where they need to become 
proactive about procurement fraud. Billions of dollars are being lost on procurement fraud, and 
only some of the losses are being recovered. However, even more will never be recovered 
because of the nature of the misconduct and the time it takes to conduct an investigation.  
 First the difference between an auditor and certified fraud examiners must be explored, 
and what advantages there are of either position. An auditor is a person who reviews financial 
statements and processes for any material misstatements. They are focused on ensuring the 
financial data of an organization is mostly error-free. They are also focused on ensuring the 
organization is following all accounting policies, such as Generally Accepted Accounting 
Principles, Generally Accepted Auditing Standards, or within the government all policies 
enacted by the Governmental Accounting Standards Board. Although there are times that 
auditors do find fraudulent activity, they are not necessarily searching for it. For example, the 
Defense Contract Audit Agency find more situations where agencies can save money on 
contracts, but not because there is fraudulent activities going on. They are finding savings for the 
agencies on various aspects of the contracts. Auditors focus on the processes and specific 
numbers of the financial data of an organization, and want to ensure that what is being presented 
to the public is mostly error-free. (Putra, 2012) 
 Fraud examiners generally have a very different mindset. Fraud examiners have already 
been presented with findings that suggest misconduct is occurring. They investigate with the 
focus of proving that there is improper activity occurring. They have many of the same skills of 
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auditors. However, they have additional expertise regarding fraud. Fraud examiners hold an 
advantage as they have knowledge in both the accounting skills, the investigative, and litigation 
skills and experience required to properly handle fraudulent misconduct. These professionals 
understand how financial statements work and are supposed to look when properly prepared, 
understand how the accounting systems work, and the accounting principles that companies and 
organizations must follow. They also understand investigation techniques and processes, which 
includes the proper way to look for evidence, what type of evidence is needed, and how to 
handle the evidence correctly so that it can be used in a court case. They will have knowledge on 
the United States laws and statutes that are related to fraudulent conduct, and also on the other 
legal aspects of a court case. (Wells, 2003) 
 Fraud examination takes years to be fully educated in the field. The field is constantly 
changing and evolving because of the way that technology evolves. Fraud auditors have the 
option to become certified through a license with the Association of Certified Fraud Examiners. 
A person must apply to the Association for the license, he or she must pass an exam. Finally an 
approval committee will review and approve the person for the certification. To be eligible for 
the exam, the candidate must have a minimum of a bachelor’s degree and at least two years of 
working experience in a related industry, such as accounting, auditing, or law. These 
qualifications show that the candidate has knowledge and experience of the proper ways business 
should be conducted. The examination requires education in fraud prevention and deterrence, 
financial transactions and fraud schemes, investigation, and law. The candidate will have 
knowledge of why perpetrators commit fraud, how they commit fraud, what the financial 
transactions will look like, all the different fraud schemes, etc. They can learn this information 
through college courses, test preparation classes, and work experience. Colleges are still 
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implementing fraud classes, so the best way to obtain this education is through job experience in 
a related field, such as accounting, auditing, or law. Once the license is obtained, the person must 
complete Continuing Professional Education points. These points can be earned through a 
variety of different seminars, training classes, college courses, etc. These points keep the license 
holder aware of the changes in the field, new techniques for investigation, and new technologies 
used to discover fraudulent activity. This license qualifies the person as an expertise in the field, 
which is beneficial for both his or her own career advancement and the reputation of the 
company the employee works for. (Association of Certified Fraud Examiners, Inc., 2016) 
   
Recommendation 
 So the question is, “How can the government become more proactive in fighting 
procurement fraud?” Based on the research above, my opinion is the auditors and investigators in 
the various agencies should be encouraged, if not required, to obtain the Certified Fraud 
Examiners License. By encouraging the current employees within the agency to obtain this 
license, this will create benefits for the employee and the agency. The candidate will have a 
higher chance of achieving the qualifications to become a CFE as they have significant 
experience in auditing and investigation. This will become an advantage with preparation for the 
exam. An experienced auditor or investigator will already know the processes of the agency. 
They will have knowledge on how an audit is conducted, how an investigation is conducted, and 
what is typically looked for or found when dealing with misconduct. They will know the various 
policies that need to be followed such as GAAP, GAAS, and the standards of the Governmental 
Accounting Standards Board. Many of these aspects are involved in the four different parts of the 
exam. This will also help improve the daily tasks they complete as it will teach them different 
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approaches to their work. This will benefit the agency as it will obtain more qualified employees 
through the license, and will improve the processes already implemented.  
The complexity of procurement fraud and the amount of damages it can cause requires an 
expert. Those that obtain the license will be required to complete continuing education points, 
which will keep the CFEs stay current with techniques and tactics through the various seminars, 
classes, and other methods of education they will be required to attend to keep the license. They 
will be able to better assist agencies in strengthening internal controls, ethics programs and 
policies with the newest practices developed based on information gathered in these various 
classes.  
 There is an advantage to the OIG having the CFEs as they are typically the first people to 
discover fraud besides whistleblowers and the company’s own employees. By the OIG 
encouraging or requiring its employees to obtain the certification, they can better assist DCIS 
when turning over potential fraud information. They will be able to provide more detailed 
information to the investigators based on their knowledge, which will assist with more successful 
investigations. DCIS encouraging or requiring its employees to obtain the certification will 
further improve the investigations. CFEs are required to have training and education in 
investigation techniques, how to write reports properly, and other aspects of the investigation 
process to pass the exam. The Department of Justice would benefit from having CFEs on its staff 
because they are also required to have education and training in laws and statutes that are related 
to fraudulent activity. Although they are successfully recouping money through the False Claims 




Not only with the CFE license significantly help improve the work that currently being 
done, but can also assist in the prevention and deterrence of procurement fraud. The CFEs are 
properly educated and trained in prevention and deterrence tactics through strengthening internal 
controls, strengthening policies regarding fraudulent conduct, and creating training programs to 
properly train agencies’ employees on fraudulent conduct. The CFEs can create training 
programs with the agencies. These programs will include basic fraud classes for the employees 
so they will know what to look for when working with vendors and coworkers. The programs 
can also include information regarding how to handle suspicions of fraudulent conduct. They can 
educate on the Whistleblower program. They can also assist in rewriting policies regarding 
fraudulent conduct. By creating more stringent policies regarding what actions will be taken if 
caught committing fraudulent activities, this can act as a deterrent for potential future fraudsters. 
Finally by assisting with strengthening internal controls, the company can create more barriers 
within the system to fight against employee manipulation and potential vendor fraudulent 
activities. 
Although improving current processes and daily tasks is important, this is still working in 
a reactive manner. Agencies need to become more proactive against this fraudulent scheme. 
Procurement fraud is costing DOD agencies too much money to continue on the track of only 








 Although procurement fraud is starting to decline compared to the various other types of 
frauds, it still is too costly to all organizations to ignore. With government procurement fraud, 
taxpayers’ dollars are being abused and stolen. The public trusts that contracting officers will do 
their due diligence to ensure they are using the best and most reliable vendors and suppliers. 
When fraud cases like these occur, the public trust diminishes and creates a bad reputation for 
the acquisition workforce. The agencies fighting fraud need to become more proactive, so that 
the taxpayers’ dollars are not being lost to illegal activity. They also need to strengthen the trust 
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